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Abstract. Digital watermarking has been considered as a solution for
copyright protection applications. However, in some practical applications, it
is necessary to use multiple watermarks for diﬀerent purposes. In this study, we
embed robust, semifragile, and fragile watermarks simultaneously. To achieve
this goal, we previously reported the results obtained by combining an ex-
isting scheme with our novel method. In the present study, we describe a
more eﬃcient combined method based on our recent ﬁndings, including nega-
tive correlation watermarking for a robust scheme, just-noticeable diﬀerences
visual model watermarking for a semifragile method, and error-diﬀusion wa-
termarking for a fragile property. The experimental evaluations showed that
the proposed method is eﬀective for multiple watermarking.
1. Introduction
We live in a digital and Internet world, where the security of multimedia data
on the Internet is a challenging topic. Most of the existing watermarking schemes
used to address this problem are designed for copyright protection or content au-
thentication.
Practical applications often require the use of multiple watermarks for diﬀerent
purposes. In our previous study [1], we reported the results obtained by combining
an existing scheme with our novel method. In this study, we present a more eﬃcient
multiple watermarking method based on three of our recently proposed approaches.
The ﬁrst approach, called robust watermarking (RW), is used for copyright
protection and the embedded watermark should be resistant to any processing
that does not seriously aﬀect the quality of the host image. To achieve this goal,
the diﬀerence between the frequency coeﬃcients and uniformly distributed real
numbers is used as the embedded watermark based on our previous study [2].
The second approach, called semifragile watermarking (SFW), is used for soft
image authentication and integrity veriﬁcation. Thus, the watermark should be
insensitive to mild modiﬁcations such as lossy compression, but fragile to any ma-
licious attempt to modify the image content. To achieve this goal, we classify the
nature of the attacks by counting the number of non-detected blocks.
The third approach, called fragile watermarking (FW), is used for strict image
authentication and integrity veriﬁcation. Thus, the watermark should not tolerate
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any tampering and any changes or modiﬁcations of the image will be reﬂected in
the hidden watermark [3][4]. In this method, we use a watermark based on an
error-diﬀusion scheme that achieves dithering by diﬀusing the quantization error
of a pixel to its neighboring pixels, according to the distribution coeﬃcients [5].
In particular, when we consider image authentication, practical methods should
be more robust to normal noise and lossy compression, which is necessary for eﬃ-
cient transmission over the Internet. Therefore, classical authentication techniques,
such as hash-based message authentication codes [6] and digital signature algo-
rithms that encrypt the hash value of the message using a public key authentication
mechanism [7], are not appropriate for the Internet environment. Hence, soft image
authentication is desired. Soft image authentication is sensitive to content modiﬁ-
cation and severe image quality tampering, whereas hard image authentication is
highly sensitive and it depends on the exact values of image pixels.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents RW
with a negative correlation-based scheme. Section 3 describes SFW with permis-
sible alterations, whereas Section 4 describes FW using a modiﬁed error diﬀusion
scheme. Section 5 presents our experimental results. Finally, Section 6 states our
conclusions.
2. Watermarking with a negative correlation-based scheme: RW
A ﬁngerprinting application was tested using this method and our preliminary
ﬁndings were reported in a previous study [2].
2.1. Watermark construction
In the proposed algorithm, to construct a watermark W , we compute two ele-
ments (the largest and smallest values) from the embedded area. In this study, we
use the term “Ea” to refer to the embedded area after processing the image using
randomization and the discrete cosine transform (DCT) (see Fig. 1).
Next, we generate a uniform distribution of random numbers from a speciﬁed
interval [max(Ea),min(Ea)], denoted by Pmark. We then obtain the embedded
watermark using Eq. 1:
W = Ea − Pmark, (1)
where Pmark is a sequence of uniformly distributed pseudorandom numbers.
2.2. Watermark embedding
The embedding of the watermark wi into the host signal xi is usually mul-
tiplicative or additive. In general, the multiplicative rule y = xi(1 + αi · wi) is
used to embed the watermark. In the frequency domain, to improve watermark
detectability, Barni et al. proposed the multiplicative rule yi = xi+αi · |xi| ·wi [8].
The watermark values have a negative property, thus we consider an additive
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Figure 1. Embedding process including watermark construction.
embedding rule, as shown in Eq. 2. In the proposed method, a unique watermark
is inserted into the DCT domain with strength α. We then deﬁne Ea+w as the
watermarked area constructed using Eq. 2:
Ea+w = Ea + α ·W. (2)
Figure 1 shows the embedding process, including watermark construction.
2.3. Watermark detection
The goal of this research is to detect watermarks that are subjected to various
attacks in an eﬃcient manner. The proposed detection process is based on linear
correlation and it is illustrated in Fig. 2. We obtain the pseudorandom numbers
related to the watermark embedded during the embedding step using Eq. 3. Note
that the numbers used to detect the watermark are not the same as those employed
in its construction:
corr =
1
M
∑
Ea+w · P ′mark (3)
where M is the size of the embedded area, and P ′mark is a set of uniformly dis-
tributed pseudorandom numbers. However, P ′mark is a scaled and possibly shifted
version of Pmark, although it is obtained using the same key.
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randomization and the discrete cosine transform (DCT) (see Fig. 1).
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detectability, Barni et al. proposed the multiplicative rule yi = xi+αi · |xi| ·wi [8].
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embedding rule, as shown in Eq. 2. In the proposed method, a unique watermark
is inserted into the DCT domain with strength α. We then deﬁne Ea+w as the
watermarked area constructed using Eq. 2:
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Figure 1 shows the embedding process, including watermark construction.
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correlation and it is illustrated in Fig. 2. We obtain the pseudorandom numbers
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Figure 2. Watermark detection process.
3. Watermarking with permissible alterations: SFW
We propose an image block feature construction and embedding method that
uses the just-noticeable diﬀerences (JND) visual model and a corresponding de-
tection method using wavelet transforms. JND [9] has been used previously in
image-adaptive watermarking, but our method is diﬀerent because the watermark
detection method uses a wavelet property and the embedding strength is image
adaptive parameter based on JND and an image block feature. Research into SFW
often fails to address the importance of the watermark strength. A preliminary
test of this method was reported in our previous study [10].
3.1. Watermark and image feature
First, we construct a watermark, W , from a pseudo-random ﬂoating point se-
quence that comprises an array of M -by-N numbers (the same size as the original
image), which have a Gaussian distribution with an average of 0 and variance of 1.
Second, we generate an image block feature, Bk, where 1 ≤ k ≤ t and t is the
total number of 8× 8 blocks (t = M/8×N/8, where the original image is M ×N),
B = bij , bij = 0 or 1, i = 1, 2, ..., 8 and j = 1, 2, ..., 8. To construct an image block
feature, we compare the summation of two subsets for each 8 × 8 block, which
are denoted as “subset 1” and “subset 2” in Fig. 3. If the summation of the pixel
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(M/8 ??N/8, Binary)
YES
1
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Figure 3. Generating an image block feature.
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Figure 4. Embedding diagram for semi-fragile watermarking.
values in subset 1 is greater than that in subset 2, then the “image block feature”
Bk = 1, otherwise Bk = 0. A block diagram of the embedding scheme is illustrated
in Fig. 4.
3.2. Approach for image adaptive watermarking
In the proposed system, we embed a watermark using a threshold unit, which
is often called “just-noticeable diﬀerences” or JND [9]. Originally, the JND scheme
was applied to image compression, but it was recently introduced as an adaptive
watermarking technique [11]. Let Jijk be a threshold (JND) and the values used
by the method are described as Eq. 4:
Jijk = eijk/mijk, (4)
where eijk is the (i,j)-th quantization error in the k-th block given by Eq. 5 and
mijk is the (i,j)-th contrast masking in the k-th block given by Eq. 6.
The DCT transform is applied to each 8× 8 image block and cijk is the (i,j)-th
frequency component of the k-th block. Each block is then quantized by dividing
it, coeﬃcient by coeﬃcient, using the quantization matrix qij . The quantization
error eijk in the DCT domain is then:
eijk = cijk − (⌊cijk/qij + 0.5⌋)qij , (5)
mijk = max[tijk, |cijk|wij t1−wijijk ], (6)
where tijk is the (i,j)-th luminance masking in the k-th block given by Eq. 7 and
wij is a number between zero and one, which we can assume has a diﬀerent value
for each DCT basis function. A typical empirically derived value for wij is 0.7. Let
tijk be given by:
tijk = tij(c00k/cˆ00)
aT (7)
where tij is the (i,j)-th frequency sensitivity is given by qij/2, c00k is the DC
coeﬃcient of the DCT for block k, cˆ00 is the DC coeﬃcient that corresponds to the
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wij is a number between zero and one, which we can assume has a diﬀerent value
for each DCT basis function. A typical empirically derived value for wij is 0.7. Let
tijk be given by:
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mean luminance of the display, and aT is a parameter that controls the degree of
luminance sensitivity. In a previous study [12], it was suggested that aT is set to
0.649.
3.3. Watermark embedding
In the proposed method, an 8-by-8 watermark is inserted in the spatial domain
based on the adaptive strength α. This is particularly important in the case of
SFW. We deﬁne Xk as the original image block of 8-by-8 and we deﬁne Yk as the
watermarked image block (8-by-8) given by Eq. 8. We deﬁne Wk as the watermark
block and deﬁne α as the embedding strength:
Yk = Xk + α ·Wk, α =

5, if |DCT (Xk)| ≥ |Jk|
and Bk = 1,
1, otherwise.
(8)
Figure 5 shows the original image X, watermarked image Y , and embedded
information as a watermarkW composed ofWk. It can be seen that the watermark
is distributed in all the areas of the image.
Original Image Watermarked Image Difference value
Figure 5. Original and watermarked images.
3.4. Watermark detection
The aim of this method is to detect the presence or absence of a watermark on
a block-by-block basis to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed algorithms. We
use the wavelet transform and linear correlation to detect the presence or absence of
a watermark on a block-by-block basis. Each block of the attacked image is divided
into low and high frequency coeﬃcients by the discrete wavelet transform (DWT).
The low frequency portion is set to zero. This signal is processed by inverse DWT
(Ak).
Let Ik be an indicator variable, which is 1 if the watermark is not detected in
block k and 0 if it is detected. If the correlation value (corrk) is less than some
threshold T , then it is a non-detected block (Ik = 1)(see Eq. 9). The detector
counts the number of non-detected blocks in the image and this number (S) is
used to estimate whether the image modiﬁcation was malicious or non-malicious
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(see Eq. 10).
corrk =
1
64
∑
Ak ·Wk (9)
S =
t∑
k=1
Ik (10)
where t is the total number of 8 × 8 blocks in the watermarked image. Figure 6
shows the block diagram of the watermark detection system.
4. Watermarking using a modiﬁed error diﬀusion scheme: FW
A preliminary test of this method was reported in our previous study [1].
4.1. Watermark embedding
In the FW step, we apply a modiﬁed error diﬀusion scheme to bitplanes
from the ﬁrst bit plane (MSB) to the sixth bit plane (BP1−6), or to the sev-
enth bit plane (BP1−7), to produce an image-dependent dithered image. The
bitplanes (BP1−6 or BP1−7) of input image (XRW+SFW ) are denoted by b(i, j),
where i and j denote the spatial position of the pixel.
The intensity value for every pixel in image b(i, j) is converted into 0 or 255 and
compared to a threshold value T (128 in experiments), which is given by Eq. 11.
Let c(i, j) be the converted pixel intensity value of point (i, j), then
c(i, j) =
{
255, if b(i, j) ≥ T
0, otherwise.
(11)
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The value e(i, j) represents the diﬀerence between b(i, j) and c(i, j), which is
given by Eq. 12.
e(i, j) = b(i, j)− c(i, j). (12)
The value e(i, j) is diﬀused to four diﬀerent pixels after multiplication by the
weighting factors (7/16, 3/16, 5/16, 1/16) and strength β (value 0.3) to obtain the
error diﬀusion value ed(i, j), which is given by Eq. 13:
ed(i+ 1, j) = e(i, j) ∗ 7/16 ∗ β
ed(i− 1, j + 1) = e(i, j) ∗ 3/16 ∗ β
ed(i, j + 1) = e(i, j) ∗ 5/16 ∗ β
ed(i+ 1, j + 1) = e(i, j) ∗ 1/16 ∗ β (13)
where ed(i+1, j) is the diﬀusion to the next pixel, and ed(i− 1, j+1), ed(i, j+1),
and ed(i+ 1, j + 1) are the diﬀusions to the next lines.
The weight factors with strength β are the modiﬁed Floyd and Steinberg error
diﬀusion coeﬃcients [5], which are used to control the diﬀusion characteristics of
the errors that appear in the detection output, and they are employed to make
authentication decisions (LPOR1,2 , see Fig. 9). An example of the error diﬀusion
scheme is shown in Fig. 7. Please note that we use the value ‘255’ to indicate a
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binary ‘1’ in “d(i, j) dithered image.”
Let G be a logo with a size of M × N . We tile G into a new array GI so
it is the same size as the original image (I × J). In addition, we apply the
XOR operation to the dithered image (d(i, j)) and GI. Finally, the fragile wa-
termarked image (XRW+SFW+FW ) is obtained by adding the result of the XOR
operation to the least signiﬁcant bit (LSB) plane of the semifragile watermarked
images (XRW+SFW ).
4.2. Watermark detection
In the fragile watermark detection step, we can verify whether the watermarked
image has been tampered with. The watermarked bitplanes (BP1−6 or BP1−7) are
processed by the error diﬀusion algorithm (see Fig. 7). We apply the XOR operation
to the dithered image and the LSB bitplane (or the second LSB bitplane). The
resulting image is processed by the XOR operation with a tiled pattern logo, which
is produced from the extracted logo image or original logo image. It is easier to
recognize the tampered area using an OR operation between two tiled pattern
logos.
5. Experimental results
Our embedding system is summarized in Fig. 8. The watermark detection
system has three steps and each can be performed independently, as shown in
Fig. 9. We tested the proposed algorithm using the 512 × 512 Barbara grayscale
image.
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Figure 8. Multipurpose watermark embedding system.
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The value e(i, j) represents the diﬀerence between b(i, j) and c(i, j), which is
given by Eq. 12.
e(i, j) = b(i, j)− c(i, j). (12)
The value e(i, j) is diﬀused to four diﬀerent pixels after multiplication by the
weighting factors (7/16, 3/16, 5/16, 1/16) and strength β (value 0.3) to obtain the
error diﬀusion value ed(i, j), which is given by Eq. 13:
ed(i+ 1, j) = e(i, j) ∗ 7/16 ∗ β
ed(i− 1, j + 1) = e(i, j) ∗ 3/16 ∗ β
ed(i, j + 1) = e(i, j) ∗ 5/16 ∗ β
ed(i+ 1, j + 1) = e(i, j) ∗ 1/16 ∗ β (13)
where ed(i+1, j) is the diﬀusion to the next pixel, and ed(i− 1, j+1), ed(i, j+1),
and ed(i+ 1, j + 1) are the diﬀusions to the next lines.
The weight factors with strength β are the modiﬁed Floyd and Steinberg error
diﬀusion coeﬃcients [5], which are used to control the diﬀusion characteristics of
the errors that appear in the detection output, and they are employed to make
authentication decisions (LPOR1,2 , see Fig. 9). An example of the error diﬀusion
scheme is shown in Fig. 7. Please note that we use the value ‘255’ to indicate a
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binary ‘1’ in “d(i, j) dithered image.”
Let G be a logo with a size of M × N . We tile G into a new array GI so
it is the same size as the original image (I × J). In addition, we apply the
XOR operation to the dithered image (d(i, j)) and GI. Finally, the fragile wa-
termarked image (XRW+SFW+FW ) is obtained by adding the result of the XOR
operation to the least signiﬁcant bit (LSB) plane of the semifragile watermarked
images (XRW+SFW ).
4.2. Watermark detection
In the fragile watermark detection step, we can verify whether the watermarked
image has been tampered with. The watermarked bitplanes (BP1−6 or BP1−7) are
processed by the error diﬀusion algorithm (see Fig. 7). We apply the XOR operation
to the dithered image and the LSB bitplane (or the second LSB bitplane). The
resulting image is processed by the XOR operation with a tiled pattern logo, which
is produced from the extracted logo image or original logo image. It is easier to
recognize the tampered area using an OR operation between two tiled pattern
logos.
5. Experimental results
Our embedding system is summarized in Fig. 8. The watermark detection
system has three steps and each can be performed independently, as shown in
Fig. 9. We tested the proposed algorithm using the 512 × 512 Barbara grayscale
image.
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5.1. FW
The results of the tampering detection experiment obtained using FW are shown
in Fig. 10 and 11. We added a spot and tampered with one region of the water-
marked image. The tampered region was identiﬁed by the XOR operation and OR
operation, as described in Section 4. Please refer to Fig. 9 for details of the terms
LP1, LP2, LP
XOR
1 , LP
XOR
2 , and LP
OR
1,2 .
5.2. SFW
The following manipulations were established as examples of non-malicious
modiﬁcations [13]:
− Median ﬁltering with a support of 3 × 3,
− Salt-and-pepper noise, up to one percent,
− Histogram equalization (uniform distribution),
− Sharpening (unsharp masking ﬁlter with coeﬃcients [-1 -1 -1; -1 9 -1; -1 -1 -1]),
− Low-pass ﬁltering within a support of 3 × 3 (equal weight coeﬃcients equal to
1/9),
− Additive Gaussian noise down to a signal-to-noise ratio of 35 dB,
− Mild compression, e.g., up to 50% JPEG.
Based on experiments, we found that T=0.01 gave the best results when clas-
sifying JPEG compression less than 40% as malicious and greater than 50% as
Digital Image Watermarking with Robust, Semifragile, and Fragile Properties 51
Tampered image ??? ???
?????? ?????? ???????
Figure 10. Results obtained with fragile watermarking after a tamper-
ing attack.
Tampered image ??? ???
?????? ?????? ???????
Figure 11. Results obtained with fragile watermarking after a tamper-
ing attack.
non-malicious. In Fig. 6, we have shown a block diagram that illustrates water-
mark detection and the counting of a non-detected block. In our experiment, if
S ≥ 80 in the attacked image, it was regarded as a malicious attack (see Table 1).
White squares are used to indicate blocks where the watermark was not detected
in Fig. 12.
5.3. RW
Figure 13 shows the results of negative correlation-based detection after basic
image processing and JPEG compression.
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Median filtering Salt and pepper noise Histogram equalization Sharpening Low-pass filtering
Gaussian noise JPEG100 JPEG90 JPEG80 JPEG70
JPEG60 JPEG50 JPEG40 JPEG30 JPEG20
Figure 12. Results obtained with semifragile watermarking. The white
squares indicate non-detected blocks.
Table 1. Number of white blocks (non-detected watermark blocks)
using Barbara as the test image
Attacks Intention* Number of non- Detected
detected blocks Intention*
Median filtering N 9 N
Salt & pepper noise N 1 N
Histogram equalization N 1 N
Sharpening N 4 N
Low-pass filtering N 20 N
Gaussian noise N 1 N
JPEG(100) N 1 N
JPEG(90) N 3 N
JPEG(80) N 7 N
JPEG(70) N 13 N
JPEG(60) N 18 N
JPEG(50) N 39 N
JPEG(40) M 94 M
JPEG(30) M 242 M
JPEG(20) M 569 M
*Intention of attack: malicious attack (M) and non-malicious attack (N)
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Figure 13. Results of robust watermarking after basic image process-
ing and JPEG compression. The detector responded to 500 randomly
generated watermarks and the correct watermark with a negative ori-
entation is shown in the graph. The true key is found at number “200.”
6. Conclusion
In this study, we proposed a framework that incorporates three watermarks
with robust, semifragile, and fragile characteristics. A fragile watermarking algo-
rithm based on the error diﬀusion scheme was also proposed. Using SFW, we can
determine the nature of attacks by counting the number of non-detected blocks. Fi-
nally, we can maintain copyright ownership using a robust watermark even though
the fragile and semifragile watermarks become invalid.
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6. Conclusion
In this study, we proposed a framework that incorporates three watermarks
with robust, semifragile, and fragile characteristics. A fragile watermarking algo-
rithm based on the error diﬀusion scheme was also proposed. Using SFW, we can
determine the nature of attacks by counting the number of non-detected blocks. Fi-
nally, we can maintain copyright ownership using a robust watermark even though
the fragile and semifragile watermarks become invalid.
【140417-0-5】JMM_7_本文.indd   59 2014/04/28   10:16:12
54 H. Kang and K. Iwamura
References
[1] H. Kang, Y. Park, B. Kurkoski, K. Yamaguchi, and K. Kobayashi, “Multiple Watermark-
ing with Semifragile Property,” Hawaii and SITA Joint Conference on Information Theory,
HISC, pp. 142–147, 2007.
[2] H. Kang and K. Iwamura, “Collusion-Resistant Watermarking Using Modiﬁed Barni
Method,” Ubiquitous Information Technologies and Applications, Lecture Notes in Elec-
trical Engineering 280, Springer-Verlag, 2014.
[3] M.M. Yeung and F. Mintzer, “An Invisible Watermarking Technique for Image Veriﬁca-
tion,” Proc. of IEEE conf. Image Processing, Vol. 2, pp. 680–683, 1997.
[4] P.W. Wong and N. Memon, “Secret and Public Key Image Watermarking Schemes for
Image Authentication and Ownership Veriﬁcation,” IEEE Trans. Image Processing, Vol.
10, No. 10, pp. 1593–1601, 2001.
[5] R. Floyd and L. Steinberg, “An Adaptive Algorithm for Spatial Grayscale,” Proc. SID,
Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 75–77, 1976.
[6] M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk, “Keyed Hash Function for Message Authen-
tication,” Advances in Cryptology-Crypto 96 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science Vol. 1109, Springer-Verlag, pp. 1–15, 1996.
[7] R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and
Public-Key Cryptosystems,” Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21, pp. 120–126, 1978.
[8] M. Barni, F. Bartolini, V. Cappellini, and A. Piva, “Robust Watermarking of Still Images
for Copyright Protection,” In Proc. 13th Inter. Conf. Digital Signal Processing, vol. 2, pp.
499–502, 1997.
[9] A.B. Watson, “DCT Quantization Matrices Visually Optimized for Individual Images,”
Proc. of SPIE Int. Conf. Human Vision, Visual Processing, and Digital Display IV, vol.
1913, pp. 202–216, 1993.
[10] H. Kang, B. Kurkoski, K. Yamaguchi, and K. Kobayashi, “Detecting Malicious Attacks
Using Semi-Fragile Watermark Based on Visual Model,” Mexican Conference on Infor-
matics Security (MCIS2006), Oaxaca, Mexico, November 2006.
[11] C.I. Podilchuk and W. Zeng, “Image-adaptive Watermarking Using Visual Models,” IEEE
J. Select. Areas Commun., vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 525–539, May 1998.
[12] H.A. Peterson, A.J. Ahumada, Jr., and A.B. Watson, “Improved detection model for DCT
coeﬃcient quantization,” Proc. of SPIE Int. Conf. Human Vision, Visual Processing, and
Digital Display IV, vol. 1913, pp. 191–201, 1993.
[13] O. Ekici, B. Sankur, B. Coskun, U. Naci, and M. Akcay, “Comparative evaluation of
semifragile watermarking algorithms,” Journal of Electronic Imaging, vol. 13, pp. 209–
219, Jan. 2004.
Hyunho Kang
Department of Electrical Engineering, Tokyo University of Science
6-3-1 Niijuku, Katsushika-ku, Tokyo, 125-8585, Japan
kang@ee.kagu.tus.ac.jp
Keiichi Iwamura
Department of Electrical Engineering, Tokyo University of Science
6-3-1 Niijuku, Katsushika-ku, Tokyo, 125-8585, Japan
iwamura@ee.kagu.tus.ac.jp
Josai Mathematical Monographs
vol. 7 (2014), pp. 55-65
A relation between irreversibility and unlinkability
for biometric template protection algorithms
Manabu Inuma
Abstract. For biometric recognition systems, privacy protection of en-
rolled users’ biometric information, which are called biometric templates, is a
critical problem. Recently, various template protection algorithms have been
proposed and many related previous works have discussed security notions
to evaluate the protection performance of these protection algorithms. Irre-
versibility and unlinkability are important security notions discussed in many
related previous works. In this paper, we prove that unlinkability is a stronger
security notion than irreversibility.
1. Introduction
Biometrics is a technique which automatically recognizes an individual by us-
ing his/her physical or behavioral characteristics such as ﬁngerprints, face, vein
pattern, (on-line or oﬀ-line) handwriting, or gait. A biometric recognition system
stores biometric features extracted from each user’s biometric characteristic. The
stored biometric features of each user is called a (biometric) template. During ver-
iﬁcation, it compares freshly extracted biometric features with stored biometric
features and decides whether these two biometric feature sets originate in the same
user or not. Biometric features extracted from a user’s biometric characteristic are
strongly linked to the user and almost unchangeable during his/her lifetime. Once
biometric features of a user are leaked together with the user’s identity, he/she will
face a severe risk of identity theft. Moreover, biometric features often contain sen-
sitive privacy information about the user. To solve these security problems, some
traditional biometric authentication system utilizes a symmetric-key or public-key
encryption scheme (Enc,Dec), where Enc and Dec are the encryption and decryp-
tion algorithms, respectively. During enrollment, the system encrypts each user’s
biometric features x into a cyphertext Enc(x) and stores it in some storage de-
vice, and, during veriﬁcation, decrypts Enc(x) into the original biometric features
x = Dec(Enc(x)) and compares x with freshly extracted biometric features x′.
However, such a traditional system has the problem that the adversary who knows
all algorithms and all keys utilized in the system can easily recover the original bio-
metric features x from a cyphertext Enc(x), even if he does not present biometric
features x′ suﬃciently close to x. For example, a malicious administrator of the
biometric system might recover user’s biometric features and abuse them.
55
【140417-0-5】JMM_7_本文.indd   60 2014/04/28   10:16:12
